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GROUNDED APPLICATIONS: FEMINISM AND
LAW AT THE M[LLENNUM
Katharine Silbaugh°
The conference topic is feminism in the twenty-first century, a
dialogue between academics and practicing attorneys. The first order of
business will be to resist the millennium invitation to come up with
evermore novel, overarching formulations of the mission and means of
feminism. At the end of the twentieth century we know quite a bit about
the problems presented by feminists and the problems within feminism.
We have had a long history of insightful intellectual discourse on
questions of equality and on the meaning of gender. We also know that
it takes time to absorb and apply broad insights in particular contexts,
and to reformulate and refine those insights ever-so-slightly, not just
radically, in light of that contextual application. The challenging task is
not to forget what we do know. To suggest that feminism in the twenty-
first century needs a new overarching theory, a new paradigm, would
suggest that its current insights have failed.
It seems to me, instead, that one important aspect of the future of
feminist legal approaches will be in asking how some of the debates
we've already had apply to particular legal questions in light of the most
detailed account we can make of the relationship between women's lives
and that particular legal question. In other words, not every feminist
legal academic needs to be creating a theory of feminism. We can
instead be scholars of particular legal fields or of particular experiences
common to some or all women and ask how the law responds to that
experience. This is applied feminist legal theory. In my remarks, rm
going to explore two very familiar feminist debates: how to understand
women's differences from men, and how to understand women's
differences from one another. The exploration of these debates will be
in the context of a particularly, though by no means exclusively, female
experience: domestic labor or family care. I hope that our dialogue on
this exercise may teach us something more about the feminist debates,
but more, I hope it can assist in developing a more satisfying legal
response to the substantive issue in light of feminist insights.
WHAT WE KNow Now ABOUT DoMmTnc LABOR
I want to look at the issue of domestic labor as a vehicle for con-
sidering the application of feminist insights simply because it is a subject
I've studied for several years. In using the term domestic labor, rm
speaking about work that is done in the home, ordinarily without pay,
that improves the welfare of the family. It includes child care, cooking,
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law; B.A, 1985, Amherst Cokge
J.D. 1992, University of Chicago. This paper was presented at the Law FeminLs & the 2lut
Centuay Conference on April 4,1998, in Portland, Maine.
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cleaning, home repair, counseling, yardwork, shopping, car maintenance,
driving, laundry, financial planning, and the many other tasks that
individuals do to improve their standards of living, and those of their
families. It is an area of human activity well-studied by sociologists and
economists, and increasingly studied by legal academics as well.
What we know about domestic labor is very significant for women.
First, women perform about twice as much unpaid domestic labor as
men. This figure changes only slightly when women work full-time in
the paid labor force, with the proportion dropping to just less than twice
what men do. In other words, this disparity is not simply a product of
women's absence, by their own choice or by exclusion, from the paid
labor market. In addition, there is some evidence that these figures don't
vary dramatically with race, ethnicity, or class.' Although different
women experience the labo very differently, most women spend a good
deal of their time engaged in it. This is what sociologists have shown us
over the past several decades, and it suggests that by sheer virtue of the
amount of women's energies it absorbs, domestic work is an important
subject to feminists.
Moreover, unpaid domestic labor produces tremendous economic
value. The United Nations estimates that women's unpaid domestic
labor produces the equivalent of eleven trillion dollars of wealth
annually worldwide; it puts the value of the entire worldwide economy
at twenty-three trillion dollars 2 Though it is much more likely that
women's work will not result in a paying transaction than is the case for
men's work, that is not a reflection on the disparate economic value of
the work.
Finally, paid domestic labor is performed overwhelmingly by minority
women. Over ninety-six percent of private household workers are
women, according to the Labor Department.3 The majority of those who
perform housecleaning are Black or Hispanic.4
THE SAMENESS-DIFFERENCE DEBATE
Feminists in law have set out an impressive amount of work on one
particular debate, and that is the sameness-difference debate. This
debate will be very familiar to all who have followed work on women
and the law in the past few decades.5 The "same" or "different" are
1. For the data supporting this paragraph, see sources cited in Katharine Silbaugh, Turning
Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L REV. 1. 8-15 (1996).
2. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HuMAN DEVELOPmENT REPORT 1995, at 97
(1995).
3. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATLTCS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMmr AND
EARNINGS, MONTHLY, Tbl. No. 649 (Jan. 1994).
4. These are the terms used by the Census Bureau, and so I use them here. See id
5. This literature is too vast to cite; but for an influential example in law, see Martha
Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Forward. Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L REV. 10
(1987).
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ways of conceiving of women when compared with men. Consequences
flow from either characterization. In the liberal tradition, if the facts
show men and women to be basically (for all relevant purposes) the
same, they are entitled to identical legal treatment-that's an easy
conclusion to reach. If they are different, it becomes a harder question
whether women and men are entitled to equal treatment, and if so, what
equal treatment means in the face of difference.
Feminists have disagreed about whether to characterize women as
more the same as or more different from men with respect to many
issues. There is a strong tradition within feminism of arguing that
women are different from men: women reason differently, women are
more cooperative and less confrontational, women seek to establish
relationships while men seek to establish rights, women are connected,
men are autonomous, women employ an ethic of caring instead of rights,
and so forth. Difference feminists argue that we ought to celebrate and
promote these differences rather than abandon them to achieve a
sameness on male terms 6 Robin West calls this cultural feminism, and
is herself an advocate of difference perspectives.7
Just as strong within feminism is a tradition of arguing that women
are almost always the same as men. This tradition has been incorporated
into our constitutional understanding of gender equality. Sameness
feminists point out that feminists aren't the only ones to have argued that
women are essentially different from men; this concept was used
historically to prevent women from enjoying the rights of citizenship
accorded men in the political, religious, social, and economic arenas.
Difference has too often served as an excuse for discrimination. More-
over, there are simply too many examples of women who defy the
"different" description (whatever that is at a given time in history)-too
many competitive women, aggressive women, selfish women, physically
strong women, smart women--to sustain a decisive account of women's
difference.
These stereotype breakers became the cause to be championed in the
Supreme Court, as case after case was litigated by men who defied a
conventional male stereotype by, for example, being supported by their
wives or wishing to raise their children at home,8 and women who defied
a conventional female stereotype, as in the case of a woman who
supports her familyY In fact, early litigators of constitutional cases were
quite concerned that any recognition of empirical differences between
the way men and women live their lives on average, even if it compen-
sated for special burdens that resulted therefrom, was unacceptable
6. This idea is most identified with Carol Giligan. See generally CAROL GII1IGA, N A
DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
7. See generally Robin West, Jwrispdence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. LREV. 1 (1988).
8. See, e.g., Weinbergerv. Wiesefeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
9. See, eg., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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because it would reinforce stereotypes.". Biology (science) is now the
one respectable true difference of the late twentieth century," as
evidenced by both the Supreme Court's hesitations over pregnancy," a
biological difference, and the scholarly debate that has surrounded the
pregnancy question." If a difference is not biological, under this view,
it is mutable, and so we cannot assume that all women or all men will fit
the different description. Those who do not may not be penalized by
categorical laws built around those stereotypes. This view has no use for
differences that are not essential, not biological, but practically and
empirically supported by significant averages.
Later feminists argued that this vision of sameness did well to protect
those individuals who defied their gender stereotypes, but did little for
those who, in significant respects, conform to those stereotypes. 4 It is
fine to challenge the notion that women are inherently different from
men, but self-defeating to prove it by making a world responsive to the
average man's needs and then inviting women who are the "same" to
partake. A requirement that you treat people equally says nothing about
how you must treat them: the rich and the poor are free to sleep. under
the bridges. In our rush to destroy stereotypes we've conceded too much
to what is sometimes called "the male standard," but could more
neutrally be termed the status quo. We must remember that feminists
can just as easily pursue "the female standard" on a gender-neutral basis,
so the Supreme Court's gender-neutrality requirement need not be
viewed as a failure in the face of this critique.
To shorten the debate: over the past few decades, many feminists have
thought that there is nothing worse than reinforcing a stereotype. Others
agree that reinforcing stereotypes is risky, but think it is far riskier to
ignore them. The latter are asking why women can't be different from
men and not be punished for it." The debate is now familiar. But its
application can still be enlightening.
Pursuit of something like "the female standard" requires us,
though, to have a frank account of empirical, but nonessential differ-
10. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,283 (1979) (striking down a gender-based alimony
eligibility statute on the grounds that even protective legislation carries "the inherent risk of
reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protection!).
11. It was religious authority that told the truth of difference in the nineteenth century. See,
e.g., Declaration of Sentmenrs, in WOMAN'S RiGHTS CONVENTIONS, SENECA FAI.LS & ROCHEStER
5-8 (Arno Press 1969) (1848).
12. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
13. For a sampling, see Henna Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy,
1 BERELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1985); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way
Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L REV. 1118 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SUP. Cr. REV.
201.
15. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Nonrs, 42 V,.ir.L REv. 1183 (1989); CATHARINE A. MACKINON. Difference and Dominance:
On Sex Discrimination, in FMIW UNMODISED 32 (1987); Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory
in Law. The Diffierence It Makes, in F r L.EGALTHEORIES 213 (Karen J. Maschke ed.. 1997).
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ences between women and men. Consider the domestic labor issue.
Surely few would argue that women have an immutable propensity to
perform domestic labor, and any given woman may perform far less of
it than any given man. My notion of difference is not concerned with
what is in women's hearts and minds, but with what most women do,
with women's material circumstances. These are rarely immutable, but
they are always highly relevant to our welfare, and so it would seem odd
to banish them from discussions of gender on the ground that they only
engage gender as a matter of stereotypes, or averages.
It turns out that the role of domestic labor in women's lives has been
surprisingly resistant to change. Advances in household technologies,
even time-saving ones, have simply led to higher standards at home, not
fewer hours. 6 Paid labor force participation by women doesn't lead to
substantially fewer hours of domestic labor, especially when compared
to men's domestic labor hours. 7 Within marriage, higher earnings for
women don't lead to fewer hours; in fact, there has even been some
evidence that high-earning wives married to low-earning husbands do
more of the household labor than wives earning less than their
husbands."
Why does the difference persist even when mothers of young children
are in the paid labor force in record numbers? Theories abound: women
are less powerful and so the work falls to them through losing informal
bargains; the work is empowering and so women choose it; it is an
efficient specialization of labor resulting from women's lower wage-
earning potential; or it's a biologically determined response to women's
childbearing abilities. There are well-argued problems with all of these
hypotheses. I cannot say that I know the answer. But I believe that we
can say something about the implications of this difference even without
fully understanding why the difference persists.
Recently some feminists have argued that the search for origins of
difference between men and women is either not worth the effort, or
positively meaningless. This agnosticism as to origins is intended to
short-circuit two uses of origins that cut different ways. Some might use
origins as a means of justifying current social and legal practices that
have a disparate impact on women, as have some of the New Home
Economists who argue that sociobiology dictates women's greater
commitment to household labor.19 Others, including feminists, might
16. SeeE usroN QuAK ECONOMI AND HOMEPROU=N: MMORYAx ?-EAREMEr
107 (1993); John P. Robinson, Housework Technology and Household Work, in WOMt AND
HOUSHOu= LABOR 53, 53-54 (Sarah Fensteunaker Berk ed., 1980); Susan M. Stra . An
Enlarged Human Existence? Technology and Household Work in NMczeenth-C~mnu Amzrica,
in WoMEN AND Housamotn LABOR 29.30-47 (Sarah Feasnakcr Berk ed 1980).
17. See, e.g., Catherine E Ross. The Division of Labor at Home. 65 Soc. FoRc 816
(1987).
18. See ARLE HOCSCHI, THE SECOND SHFr 220-21 (1989).
19. See generally GARY BECKER, ATREATSEONTHEFAMLY (1981).
19981
MAINE LAW REVIEW
hope to be guided in a return to a difficult-to-define authenticity.20 I
believe that it is appropriate, for the time being, for legal advocates to be
agnostic as to the origins of difference. Especially as lawyers, we have
a difficult time being confident about the source of differences. More
important, those differences that are socialized are no less real as a
result.
Some refuse to recognize or accommodate socially created differences
because they fear that this will reinforce those differences. But that fear
places value on eliminating diferences. In other words, skepticism over
the origin of differences often leads straight to the conclusion that the
eradication of difference is either a goal unto itself, or the only means to
achieve a different goal--the improvement of women's welfare and
happiness. I believe in the pursuit of the latter goal-improving
women's welfare and happiness by giving legal value to traditionally
female occupations-with agnosticism as to whether the gender-neutral
legal valuation of women's gendered roles will reduce difference.
Perhaps valuing women's domestic work will reduce gender segrega-
tion in sex roles rather than maintain it. Valuing women's segregated
work may make it more attractive to men. Maybe "if you build it, they
will come." Consider Duncan Kennedy's argument that sexy dressing
has the power to subvert its own meaning; he argues that there is a value
to embodying stereotypes, because it is one mechanism for dismantling
them, as we see individual women both fit the stereotype and not fit it at
the same time. 1 Despite problems with this idea as applied to sexy
dressing, the point about the occupation and subversion of stereotypes
might apply to different female stereotypes-including that of greater
attachment to children. One might embody that stereotype, for example,
and defy other stereotypes about women by being aggressive, competi-
tive, physically strong, income-earning, and so forth. This might be part
of the process of undermining the stereotype.
On the other hand, accommodating the stereotypical female biogra-
phy, including as it does both wage labor and significant family care,
may not undermine stereotypes; it may instead reinforce them as so
many have predicted. It seems an unanswerable hypothetical question,
given our current state of understanding, one that might come out either
way. But an equality of kinds will be achieved in either case when legal
reform focuses on the legal treatment of the roles typically associated
with women. Moreover, even if the result is not one talked about in the
language of equality, we might argue that valuing family care is in its
own right a good, even as it directly benefits more women than men.
We should be perfectly happy at the thought of gender-segregated sex
roles ending, if that's-what valuing women's differences does, but
without making that an end in itself.
20. See MACKINNON, supra note 15. An authenticity is implicit in her notion that women
can't experience authenticity under current conditions.
21. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 177-81 (1993).
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WOMEN'S DIFFEENCs FROM ONE ANOTHER
As feminists, we know that it is a challenge to conceptualize an issue
as though all women experience it similarly. Women are divided at least
by their experiences, religion, preferences, race, sexual orientation,
class, and age. These different perspectives greatly inform how women
think differently about domestic labor. For some women, domestic labor
is drudgery to be escaped for the more stimulating world of the paid
labor market? For others, domestic labor is the site of racialized
hierarchies that are particularly painful because they are enforced over
intimate matters, as in the case of African-American or immigrant paid
domestic workers and their often white and middle-class employers.'
For others, domestic labor in one's own home provides a creative
opportunity that is less strained by racism than market labor, 4 and more
independently managed than much paid labor. For still other women
living in poverty, domestic labor is denigrated by a government that
embraces a rhetoric suggesting that domestic labor is not work at all.?
These differences of perspective may seem so great that they threaten
our ability to have a clear feminist program around domestic labor. A
woman who thinks of the issue as "the servant question"' will have a
hard time developing solidarity with a person who views doing domestic
work in someone else's home as a reproduction of colonial race
relations. Is it possible for women, given their very different experi-
ences of domestic labor, to practice feminism around it? Mindfulness
22. This is the feminism of Betty Frdedan's early second-oave manifesto, The Feminine
M)tique, in which she asks, "Is this all.' BEITY R AN. TItE MMEYSrIQUE 15(1963).
23. See JUDI-ROUD , BErWEEN WONEN: DOMESMCS AND THEIREMPLOYRS 155-203
(1985); MARY ROMERO. MAID IN THE U.SA 97-133 (1992); Evelyn Nakano Glen, Cleaning
Up/Kept Down: A Historical Perspective on Racial Inequality in "Womens Work," 43 STA2. L
REv. 1333,1335 (1991); Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Houseywork, 9 YALE JL. &
FEMINISM 51 (1997).
24. See Patriia -fill Collms, Shifting the Center Race, Clas, and Feminist TheoryAbow
Motherhood, in REPRESENTATIONS OFMOTHERHOOD 56,64-65 (Donna Bassinet al. eds., 1994);
EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, LsNSE , WARBRIETtREGENERATONs OFIAPAnEmSA CAN
Wos N DomEsnc SERWc E 192 (1986).
25. As the welfare reform debate unfolded, we repeatedly saw women who vr taking car
of their children at home denigrated for the failure of their work ethic.
26. This was aturn.of4h-cezty term used in upper income writings about the movement
of low-wage women into indstrialjobs. This rade it harderm hire domestic sm-ants on thz terms
that had previously been commonpla, which included very low wages, long houzs, usually sven
days a week around the clock live-in wiok, and often physical discipline. See DONNmA L VAN
RAAPHO, r, UNION MADS Nor WANrED: ORGANMaNG DONM EC WOMMIS 1870-1940. at 63-71
(1988). The tension between the needs of women who employ domestic workers and the domestic
woders they employ could be seen again recently in what are called the Zoe Baird amendments to
the Social Security Act. These amendments maie it easier to employ domestic workerswithout
paying employment taxes--meaning without ervlling those wode in the od age secmity s stem.
See Social Security Domestic Employment Reform Act of 1994. Pub. L No. 103-387, 103 Star.
4071 (replacing the quartery threshold of S50 with a yIaly one of S1000 for paying social security
tax on domestic workers).
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of differences must inform how we think about domestic labor, but there
may still be common ground. What might the goals of feminism be here,
given what we know of women's differences?
If the desire to "escape" this labor is to be pursued by some, a good
feminist vision would work to conceive of a form of escape that is not
dependent on reproducing the racial hierarchies historically associated
with paid domestic workers. This could mean a range of things. It could
mean supporting efforts to make sure that immigrant, African-American,
and low-income women have alternative paid labor opportunities so that
they too can escape domestic labor, if they choose, on an equal footing
with other women. It could mean reducing the amount of domestic work
done by anyone, as with an individual decision not to have children. It
could mean reallocating the work to others for whom it is done,
including intimate partners or older children. It could mean structuring
the reallocation to paid workers and other parents in a manner designed
not to reproduce racial hierarchies, as in the case of collective day care.
It could mean minimizing the reproduction of racial hierarchies by
providing paid caregivers with all the trappings of ordinary wage labor,
including both pay that reflects the importance of the work and
employment benefits.
Moreover, feminists who prefer escape should advocate structuring
it in a way that does not harm women who prefer to-or for other
reasons will-focus on domestic labor.27 For example, some middle-
class women strongly support work requirements for welfare recipients
on the theory that changes in gender roles have now brought many
middle-class mothers of small children into the workforce, and the same
may be expected of women living in poverty. As Martha Minow points
out, this argument overlooks the content of the middle-class trade-off;
many middle-class women earn enough to make this a worthwhile
pursuit. The same may not be said of the minimum wage jobs available
to those coming off of welfare. 8 Moreover, the element of choice is
critical for middle-class women, who may have the opportunity to
choose to structure their paid labor force participation such that it
imposes the least on their family time. Finally, as a matter of principle,
feminists who don't prefer domestic labor ought to be concerned about
criticizing women who do, because expression of disdain for many
women's activities can be hard to distinguish from disdain for women.29
27. Here I think of Henna Hill Kay's view that we in family law should not reward
traditional roles because that encourages women's financial dependence, which shows Kay's clear
preference for seeing all women choose to focus primarily on paid labor. See Henna Hill Kay,
Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftemath, 56 U. ON. L REV.
1,77-89(1987).
28. See Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their Children, 26 CoNN. L
REV. 817, 826-28 (1994). For an excellent discussion of the limited options available to welfare
recipients, see Lucie R White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" from a Different
Ground, 81 GO. LJ. 1961 (1993).
29. In the middle-class context, consider the dispute among mothers in Wellesley,
Massachusetts, over whose children ought to ride the school bus longer: those who are being taken
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Feminist lawyers, legislators, and academics need to think through a
number of legal issues, including improving the compensation of paid
caregivers and the enforcement of labor laws giving paid domestic
workers benefits, reproductive control, full employment policies, the
provision of safe and affordable childcare, and dignifying poverty
supports, for their effects on domestic labor as it is experienced by a
range of women.
The insight is not novel: women are not all the same, and perceive
the same subject very differently depending on facts about their lives
other than gender3 Without a doubt these differences among women
pose a serious challenge to feminism.. Yet, in this context, feminism
need not be undermined by that difference-gender unites most women
around domestic labor simply because most women do much more of it
than do most men, regardless of their race, ethnicity, or social class'
Feminism in the twenty-first century will be productive if it brings
awareness of differences among women to bear fully in examining the
legal structure of this particular aspect of most women's experience, and
destructive if it ignores differences. Before we search for more
theoretical insight, we should try more careful application of the insights
we have.
CONCLUSION
It should not be an insult to an idea within feminism that it is one
more version of an older idea. Reading the works of feminists of the
nineteenth century can be a humbling experience; they anticipated in
some way many of the theoretical debates that would occur in late
twentieth-century feminism. Many of the ideas of feminism have long
histories and traditions. Novel reconceptualizations of feminist tensions
can be refreshing and challenging, but so can attempts to apply time-
honored feminist insights to particular legal issues.
home after school to their mothers who have limited their paid labor force tie or those rho am
being taken to after-school programs. See Adam Bryant, In the Case of Working Mothers Plekuy
ofludges, N.Y. TuMs, Nov. 16.1997, at Al8.
30. Theliterairmenrking this point is large. See,,eg., KmberclCenshaw.D earinalnng
the Intesecrion of Race and Sex A Black Feminist Critique of Aruidcrimnaidn Doctrine.
Feminist Theory andAntiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHL LEGALF. 139; Angela P. Harris. Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L REV. 581 (1990).
31. See Heidi Haruznan, The Familyas te Locus ofGender C&= andPolical Struggle:
The Example ofHousework, 6 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE &SOC'Y 366,385 (1981).
32. In aquickperasal of theDecaration ofSeniment, for example, wesee the problem of
"false consciousness" raised, the problem of womm as spectacles on the stage, the question of what
women's higher moral reasoning should mean-wether all should be held to it, the problem of
valuing what omen do, and the problem of stereotyping women. See Declaraton of Sentm s.
supra note 10.
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